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1025 
EXPANDING THE USE OF SUPPLEMENTAL 
ENVIRONMENTAL PROJECTS 
INTRODUCTION 
On June 11, 2003, the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) 
released a memorandum announcing its goal to encourage and expand the 
use of Supplemental Environmental Projects (SEPs) in settlements.1 SEPs 
are “environmentally beneficial projects which a defendant . . . agrees to 
undertake in settlement of an enforcement action, but which the defendant 
. . . is not otherwise legally required to perform.”2 In settlements of 
environmental enforcement actions, the EPA generally requires alleged 
violators to comply with federal environmental regulations and to pay a 
monetary penalty.3 The EPA will reduce the required payment in certain 
enforcement actions if the alleged violator agrees to perform a 
Supplemental Environmental Project as part of the settlement.4 The 
inclusion of SEPs in settlements furthers the “EPA’s goals to protect and 
enhance public health and the environment.”5 In its June 2003 
memorandum, the EPA noted that SEPs are being underutilized6 and that 
there is tremendous potential to achieve even greater benefits for the 
environment with the increased use of SEPs in settlements.7  
 
 
 1. “The purpose of this memorandum, therefore, is to summarize the foundation underlying our 
SEP Policy and to announce the actions we are taking to encourage and expand the use of SEPs in the 
settlement of enforcement actions.” Memorandum from John Peter Suarez, Assistant Adm’r, Envtl. 
Prot. Agency, to Assistant Adm’rs et al. 1 (June 11, 2003), available at http://www.epa.gov/ 
compliance/resources/policies/civil/seps/seps-expandinguse.pdf [hereinafter Expanding the Use of 
SEPs Memo].  
 2. Final EPA Supplemental Environmental Projects Policy Issued, 63 Fed. Reg. 24,796, 
24,797–98 (May 5, 1998) [hereinafter 1998 SEP Policy] (typeface altered) (emphasis omitted). 
 3. Id. at 24,796. 
 4. Id. at 24,797. 
 5. Id. at 24,796. 
 6. See Expanding the Use of SEPs Memo, supra note 1, at 1.  
 7.  
During FY2002, 10% of our civil judicial and administrative penalty settlements included 
SEPs valued at a total of $56.5 million dollars. While we should be proud of these figures, I 
believe that we have a tremendous opportunity to achieve greater benefits for the environment 
and communities affected by violations. Through settlements containing SEPs, we have the 
opportunity to not only bring regulated entities into compliance, but to secure public health 
and environmental benefits in addition to those achieved by compliance with applicable laws. 
As such, all enforcement staff should consider every opportunity to increase our use of SEPs 
and include more environmentally significant SEPs wherever possible.  
Id.  
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In order for an SEP to be included as part of the settlement, the 
defendant must propose and agree to carry out a project that the EPA 
determines qualifies as an SEP.8 The project must meet several 
requirements to qualify.9 One of the most limiting of these requirements is 
the nexus requirement, which states that there must be an adequate 
“relationship between the violation and the proposed project.”10 In some 
situations, there is simply no feasible project that meets this nexus 
requirement; therefore, an SEP cannot be included in the settlement. After 
the EPA accepts the proposed project, it determines the appropriate 
percentage to lower the penalty.11 The current SEP policy does not allow 
the mitigation percentage to exceed 80% of the SEP cost;12 therefore, a 
defendant who agrees to perform an SEP will end up paying more than it 
would have if it had simply paid the penalty.13 The EPA’s current SEP 
policy fails to maximize the benefits that could be realized from the use of 
SEPs in settlements. This Note argues that the EPA’s current SEP policy 
could be improved by creating and managing an Environmental Trust that 
would be used to complete SEPs, increasing the mitigation percentage to 
100% and relaxing the nexus requirement, and allowing third-party 
contractors to bid on and carry out SEP contracts.  
This Note consists of five parts. Part I provides a brief historical 
overview of SEPs and explains the current SEP policy in greater detail.14 
Part II explores the reasons for the underutilization of SEPs in settlements 
 
 
 8. See 1998 SEP Policy, supra note 2, at 24,797.  
 9. Id. 
 10. Id. at 24,798. 
[All SEPs] must have adequate nexus. Nexus is the relationship between the violation and the 
proposed project. This relationship exists only if: a. The project is designed to reduce the 
likelihood that similar violations will occur in the future; or b. The project reduces the adverse 
impact to public health or the environment to which the violation at issue contributes; or c. 
The project reduces the overall risk to public health or the environment potentially affected by 
the violation at issue.  
Id.  
 11. Id. at 24,797. 
 12. Id. at 24,802. 
 13. There are two exceptions to the 80% ceiling on the mitigation percentage.  
(1) For small businesses, government agencies or entities, and non-profit organizations, this 
mitigation percentage of the SEP COST may be set as high as 100 percent if the 
defendant/respondent can demonstrate the project is of outstanding quality. (2) For any 
defendant/respondent, if the SEP implements pollution prevention, the mitigation percentage 
of the SEP COST may be set as high as 100 percent if the defendant/respondent can 
demonstrate that the project is of outstanding quality. 
Id. 
 14. See infra Part I.  
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despite the EPA’s policy on expanding the use of SEPs.15 Part III suggests 
that the EPA should alter the SEP policy by creating an Environmental 
Trust, increasing the mitigation percentage, relaxing the nexus 
requirement, and allowing third-party contractors to bid on SEP contracts 
in order to increase the utilization of SEPs.16 Part IV focuses on whether or 
not the EPA has the authority to make the alterations suggested in Part 
III.17 Part V of this Note highlights how creation of the Environmental 
Trust, changes to the mitigation percentage and nexus requirement, and 
use of third-party contractors improve the EPA’s current SEP policy and 
discusses some of the weaknesses of the proposal.18  
I. THE DEVELOPMENT OF SEPS 
A. Historical Overview of SEPs 
SEPs were first used in the settlement of environmental enforcement 
actions in the 1980s.19 The first written reference to SEPs was in the 
EPA’s 1980 Penalty Policy.20 From the beginning, the EPA has been 
cautious with the use of SEPs and has placed several restrictions on their 
use.21 The Department of Justice (DOJ) objected to the EPA’s use of 
SEPs.22 The DOJ claimed, among other things, that the use of SEPs 
violated the appropriations process by allowing penalties that should be 
paid into the United States Treasury to be used by defendants to carry out 
SEPs.23 The United States Comptroller General, head of the General 
Accounting Office (GAO), has also been an outspoken opponent of 
 
 
 15. See infra Part II. 
 16. See infra Part III. 
 17. See infra Part IV. 
 18. See infra Part V. 
 19. Edward Lloyd, Supplemental Environmental Projects Have Been Effectively Used in Citizen 
Suits to Deter Future Violations as well as to Achieve Significant Additional Environmental Benefits, 
10 WIDENER L. REV. 413, 415 (2004). 
 20. Id. 
 21. See Kenneth T. Kristl, Making a Good Idea Even Better: Rethinking the Limits on 
Supplemental Environmental Projects, 31 VT. L. REV. 217, 222–24 (2006); Leslie J. Kaschak, Note, 
Supplemental Environmental Projects: Evolution of a Policy, 2 ENVTL. LAW. 465, 467–73 (1996). 
 22. See Environmental Credit Projects Under Clean Water Act: Hearing on H.R. 3411 Before 
the Subcomm. on Fisheries and Wildlife Conservation and the Environment and the Subcomm. on 
Oceanography of the H. Comm. on Merchant Marine and Fisheries, 100th Cong. 61–62 (1987) 
(statement of Raymond Ludwiszewski, Associate Deputy Attorney General, U.S. Department of 
Justice) [hereinafter DOJ Statement]. 
 23. Quan B. Nghiem, Comment, Using Equitable Discretion to Impose Supplemental 
Environmental Projects Under the Clean Water Act, 24 B.C. ENVTL. AFF. L. REV. 561, 568 (1997). 
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SEPs.24 In 1992, the Comptroller General issued an opinion stating that the 
EPA did not have the authority to use SEPs in settlements,25 because this 
practice violated the Miscellaneous Receipts Act (MRA).26  
Despite the opposition by the DOJ and GAO, courts have found that 
payments do not have to be paid to the Treasury as long as they are not 
defined as “penalties” and are made before the defendant is found liable.27 
Settlements are made before a finding of liability; therefore, SEP 
payments do not fall under the MRA.28 The Clean Air Act is the only 
environmental statute in which Congress has explicitly mentioned the use 
of SEPs.29 However, SEPs have been used extensively and Congress has 
not imposed any restrictions on the EPA’s use of SEPs.30 “Congress is 
aware of the use of SEPs by the EPA, and has, through legislative history 
and proposed bills,” displayed congressional acquiescence to the EPA’s 
use of SEPs.31  
The EPA created the first SEP policy in 1991.32 The 1991 SEP Policy 
identified five categories that a proposed project could fall under to qualify 
as an SEP; it also contained a requirement that the SEP be related to the 
violation (nexus requirement) and allowed the cost of the SEP to mitigate 
the monetary penalty by 100%.33 In 1995, the EPA revised the SEP 
 
 
 24. Lloyd, supra note 19, at 426. 
 25.  
The Environmental Protection Agency lacks authority to settle mobile source air pollution 
enforcement actions brought pursuant to section 205 of the Clean Air Act . . . by entering into 
settlement agreements that allow alleged violators to fund public awareness and other projects 
relating to automobile air pollution in exchange for reductions of the civil penalties assessed 
against them. 
Opinion of Comptroller General of the United States, GAO No. B-247155 (July 7, 1992), available at 
1992 WL 726317 [hereinafter 1992 GAO Opinion]. 
 26. The Miscellaneous Receipts Act requires money received by federal agents to be deposited 
into the United States Treasury. 31 U.S.C. § 3302 (2000). 
 27. See Pub. Interest Research Group of New Jersey, Inc. v. Powell Duffryn Terminals, Inc., 913 
F.2d 64 (3d Cir. 1990) (indicating that although money that the court has labeled as civil penalties 
must be paid into the Treasury, money that has not been labeled as civil penalties, such as SEP money 
in a settlement, does not have to be paid into the Treasury); Sierra Club, Inc. v. Elec. Controls Design, 
Inc., 909 F.2d 1350 (9th Cir. 1990) (holding that in a settlement agreement where there is no finding of 
liability, the prohibition against requiring the defendant to make payments to any organization other 
than the Treasury is lifted).  
 28. Sierra Club, 909 F.2d at 1355–56. 
 29. 42 U.S.C. § 7604(g)(2) (2000). See also Lloyd, supra note 19, at 423. 
 30. Lloyd, supra note 19, at 425. 
 31. Laurie Droughton, Supplemental Environmental Projects: A Bargain for the Environment, 12 
PACE ENVTL. L. REV. 789, 822–23 (1995). 
 32. Envtl. Prot. Agency, Policy on the Use of Supplemental Environmental Projects in EPA 
Settlements, 25 Envtl. L. Rep. (Envtl. Law Inst.) 35,607 (Feb. 12, 1991) [hereinafter 1991 SEP 
Policy]. 
 33. Id. 
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policy.34 The 1995 SEP Policy created a five-step process, which is still 
used today, for EPA officials to use in determining whether a proposed 
project qualifies as an SEP.35 The 1995 SEP Policy created a more strict 
nexus requirement and placed a ceiling on the mitigation percentage at 
80%.36 The EPA again revised the SEP policy in 1998 and deemed it the 
final SEP policy.37  
B. EPA’s 1998 Final SEP Policy 
On May 5, 1998, the EPA issued the Final EPA Supplement 
Environmental Projects Policy.38 The stated purpose of the policy “is to 
encourage and obtain environmental and public health protection and 
improvements that may not otherwise have occurred without the 
settlement incentives provided by this Policy.”39 The policy explains a 
five-step process that agency officials should use to determine if a 
proposed project qualifies as an SEP and to determine the appropriate 
mitigation percentage.40 The five-step process is:  
(1) Ensure that the project meets the basic definition of a SEP.  
(2) Ensure that all legal guidelines, including nexus, are satisfied.  
(3) Ensure that the project fits within one (or more) of the 
designated categories of SEPs.  
(4) Determine the appropriate amount of penalty mitigation.  
(5) Ensure that the project satisfies all of the implementation and 
other criteria.41 
1. Ensure the Project Meets the Definition of an SEP 
In order for a proposed project to qualify as an SEP, it must meet the 
basic definition of an SEP.42 The current SEP policy defines SEPs as 
 
 
 34. Interim Revised EPA Supplemental Environmental Projects Policy Issued, 60 Fed. Reg. 
24,856 (May 10, 1995) [hereinafter 1995 SEP Policy]. 
 35. Id.  
 36. Id. 
 37. 1998 SEP Policy, supra note 2. 
 38. Id. at 24,796. 
 39. Id.  
 40. Id. at 24,797. 
 41. Id. (section references omitted). 
 42. Id. 
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“environmentally beneficial projects which a defendant/respondent agrees 
to undertake in settlement of an enforcement action, but which the 
defendant/respondent is not otherwise legally required to perform.”43 The 
SEP policy breaks this definition down into three parts and gives further 
explanation as to what each part means.44 The SEP policy explains that an 
SEP must “improve, protect, or reduce risks to public health, or the 
environment at large” in order to be characterized as “environmentally 
beneficial.”45 “In settlement of an enforcement action” means that the EPA 
helps “shape the scope of the project before it is implemented,” and the 
project is not commenced until after the EPA has issued a notice of 
violation.46 Lastly, “not otherwise legally required to perform” means that 
the defendant cannot be “required by any federal, state, or local law or 
regulation” to complete the project.47 If the proposed project meets this 
basic definition, the agency official proceeds to step two.  
2. Ensure that All Legal Guidelines Are Satisfied 
The 1998 SEP Policy uses five legal guidelines to ensure that the SEPs 
are within the EPA’s authority and do not conflict with any statutory or 
constitutional requirements.48 First, a project must be consistent with the 
provisions of the statute forming the basis for the enforcement action.49 
Second, a project must meet at least one of the stated goals of the 
environmental statutes that the enforcement action is based on, and the 
project must have adequate nexus.50 Third, the EPA may not manage or 
control funds that will be used to carry out the performance of an SEP.51 
 
 
 43. Id. at 24,797–98 (typeface altered). 
 44. See id. at 24,798. 
 45. Id.  
 46. Id. 
 47. Id. This includes projects that the defendant will probably be required to perform “(1) as 
injunctive relief in the instant case; (2) as injunctive relief in another legal action U.S. EPA, or another 
regulatory agency could bring; (3) as part of an existing settlement or order in another legal action; or 
(4) by a state or local requirement.” OFFICE OF SITE REMEDIATION ENFORCEMENT, ENVTL. PROT. 
AGENCY, BROWNFIELD SITES AND SUPPLEMENTAL ENVIRONMENTAL PROJECTS (SEPs) 2 (Nov. 2006), 
available at http://www.epa.gov/compliance/resources/publications/cleanup/brownfields/brownfields-
seps.pdf. 
 48. The EPA recognizes that it has been given broad discretion to settle cases. “Accordingly, this 
Policy uses five legal guidelines to ensure that our SEPs are within the Agency’s and a federal court’s 
authority, and do not run afoul of any Constitutional or statutory requirements.” 1998 SEP Policy, 
supra note 2, at 24,798. 
 49. Id. 
 50. Id. For a discussion of the nexus requirement, see supra note 10. 
 51. Id. This Note will argue that the third guideline should be abandoned, and the EPA should 
create and manage an environmental trust to perform SEPs. 
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The EPA may monitor the performance of the project and take legal action 
if the SEP is not adequately implemented.52 Fourth, the type and scope of 
the SEP must be explained in the settlement agreement.53 Lastly, the SEP 
cannot be used to satisfy any federal agency’s statutory obligation, nor can 
an SEP give any federal agency resources to perform a project for which 
Congress has specifically appropriated funds.54  
3. Ensure that the Project Fits Within One of the Categories of SEPs 
The 1998 SEP Policy includes seven specific categories under which a 
proposed project must fall in order to qualify as an SEP.55 The Policy also 
includes an eighth category for projects that do not fall under one of the 
seven specific categories but have been determined to have environmental 
merit and meet the other provisions of the SEP policy.56 The seven 
specific categories are as follows: public health,57 pollution prevention,58 
pollution reduction,59 environmental restoration and protection,60 
 
 
 52. Id. 
 53.  
This means the “what, where and when” of a project are defined by the settlement agreement. 
Settlements in which the defendant/respondent agrees to spend a certain sum of money on a 
project(s) to be defined later (after EPA or the Department of Justice signs the settlement 
agreement) are not allowed.  
Id. 
 54. Id. 
 55. Id. at 24,799. 
 56. Id. at 24,801. 
 57. “A public health project provides diagnostic, preventative, and/or remedial components of 
human health care which is related to the actual or potential damage to human health caused by the 
violation.” Id. at 24,799. Examples of public health projects include: “epidemiological data collection 
and analysis, medical examinations of potentially affected persons, collection and analysis of 
blood/fluid/tissue samples, medical treatment and rehabilitation therapy.” Id.  
 58. “A pollution prevention project is one which reduces the generation of pollution through 
‘source reduction,’ i.e., any practice which reduces the amount of any hazardous substance, pollutant 
or contaminant entering any waste stream or otherwise being released into the environment, prior to 
recycling, treatment, or disposal.” Id. “Source reduction may include equipment or technology 
modifications, process or procedure modifications, reformulation or redesign of products, substitution 
of raw materials, and improvements in housekeeping, maintenance, training, inventory control, or 
other operation and maintenance procedures.” Id.  
 59.  
A pollution reduction project is one which results in a decrease in the amount and/or toxicity 
of any hazardous substance, pollutant or contaminant entering any waste stream or otherwise 
being released into the environment by an operating business or facility by a means which 
does not qualify as “pollution prevention.”  
Id. Pollution reduction projects include: “the installation of more effective end-of-process control or 
treatment technology, or improved containment, or safer disposal of an existing pollutant source.” Id. 
 60. “An environmental restoration and protection project is one which enhances the condition of 
the ecosystem or immediate geographic area adversely affected.” Id. These types of projects include:  
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assessments and audits,61 environmental compliance promotion,62 and 
emergency planning and preparedness.63  
4. Determine the Amount of Penalty Mitigation 
When an environmental regulation is violated, the EPA uses monetary 
penalties to deter future violations and ensure that violators are not able to 
“obtain an economic advantage over their competitors who complied” 
with the regulations.64 Defendants agree to undertake an SEP in exchange 
for a reduction in their settlement penalty.65 The EPA has developed 
another five-step process to calculate the final settlement penalty.66  
First, the settlement penalty without the SEP is calculated.67 This is 
calculated by adding the dollar value of the economic benefit the 
defendant gained from noncompliance68 with the EPA regulation to an 
 
 
Restoration of a wetland in the same ecosystem along the same avian flyway in which the 
facility is located; or purchase and management of a watershed area by the 
defendant/respondent to protect a drinking water supply where the violation . . . did not 
directly damage the watershed but potentially could lead to damage due to unreported 
discharges.  
Id. 
 61. “There are three types of projects in this category: a. Pollution prevention assessments; 
b. environmental quality assessments; and c. compliance audits.” Id. at 24,799–800.  
 62. “An environmental compliance promotion project provides training or technical support to 
other members of the regulated community to: (1) Identify, achieve, and maintain compliance with 
applicable statutory and regulatory requirements or (2) go beyond compliance by reducing the 
generation, release, or disposal of pollutants beyond legal requirements.” Id. at 24,800. For example, 
an environmental compliance promotion project could involve: “producing a seminar directly related 
to correcting widespread or prevalent violations within the defendant/respondent’s economic sector.” 
Id. “Environmental compliance promotion SEPs are acceptable only where the primary impact of the 
project is focused on the same regulatory program requirements which were violated and where EPA 
has reason to believe that compliance in the sector would be significantly advanced by the proposed 
project.” Id.  
 63. “An emergency planning and preparedness project provides assistance—such as computers 
and software, communication systems, chemical emission detection and inactivation equipment, 
HAZMAT equipment, or training—to a responsible state or local emergency response or planning 
entity.” Id. “Emergency planning and preparedness SEPs are acceptable where the primary impact of 
the project is within the same emergency planning district or state affected by the violations and EPA 
has not previously provided the entity with financial assistance for the same purposes as the proposed 
SEP.” Id.  
 64. Penalties provide regulated entities with incentives to comply with the EPA’s regulations. 
They also level the playing field among violators and their competitors who have complied. The 
penalties prevent the violators from gaining an economic advantage through noncompliance. Id. at 
24,801. 
 65. See id. 
 66. Id. 
 67. Id. 
 68. The step where the economic benefit is calculated is labeled Step 1.a. Id. 
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amount that reflects the gravity69 of the violation.70 “The gravity 
component is all of the penalty other than the identifiable economic 
benefit amount . . . .”71 The EPA has developed a penalty policy to 
calculate this gravity component.72  
Second, the minimum penalty amount with an SEP is calculated.73 
“The minimum penalty amount must equal or exceed the economic benefit 
of noncompliance plus 10 percent of the gravity component, or 25 percent 
of the gravity component only, whichever is greater.”74  
Third, the net present after-tax cost of the SEP is calculated.75 The EPA 
has developed a computer model, PROJECT, to aid in the calculation of 
the SEP cost.76 Three costs are entered into the computer model to 
determine the cost of the SEP: capital costs, one-time nondepreciable 
costs, and annual operation costs and savings.77 The SEP cost calculated 
by PROJECT is not exact; it is simply a reasonable estimate.78  
Fourth, the mitigation percentage is determined, and the mitigation 
amount is calculated.79 The mitigation percentage is determined by the 
SEP’s performance on the following six factors: benefits to the public or 
environment at large,80 innovativeness,81 environmental justice,82 
 
 
 69. The step where the gravity component is calculated is labeled Step 1.b. Id. 
 70. The step where the economic benefit and the gravity component are added is labeled Step 
1.c. Id. 
 71. Id. 
 72. Id. 
 73. Id. 
 74. Id. 
 75. Id. 
 76. Id. 
 77. Id. 
 78. Id. at 24,801 n.15. 
 79. Id. at 24,802. 
 80. “While all SEPs benefit public health or the environment, SEPs which perform well on this 
factor will result in significant and quantifiable reduction in discharges of pollutants to the 
environment and the reduction in risk to the general public.” Id. 
 81. “SEPs which perform well on this factor will further the development, implementation, or 
dissemination of innovative processes, technologies, or methods which more effectively: reduce the 
generation, release or disposal of pollutants; conserve natural resources; restore and protect 
ecosystems; protect endangered species; or promote compliance.” Id. 
 82. “SEPs which perform well on this factor will mitigate damage or reduce risk to minority or 
low income populations which may have been disproportionately exposed to pollution or are at 
environmental risk.” Id.  
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community input,83 multimedia impacts,84 and pollution prevention.85 The 
1998 SEP Policy restricts the mitigation percentage of the SEP cost from 
exceeding 80%.86 This means that for every one dollar a defendant spends 
on the SEP, that defendant only receives an eighty cent penalty reduction. 
Defendants who opt to simply pay the settlement penalty rather than 
complete an SEP end up paying less in total. The SEP cost (calculated in 
step three) is then multiplied by the mitigation percentage to obtain the 
mitigation amount.87  
Finally, the mitigation amount (calculated in step four) is subtracted 
from the settlement amount without an SEP (calculated in step one).88 The 
remainder is compared with the minimum penalty amount (calculated in 
step two) and whichever amount is greater is adopted as the final 
settlement penalty.89 
5. Ensure that the Project Satisfies All the Implementation and Other 
Criteria  
The final step is to make sure that the project complies with all of the 
implementation and other criteria.90 This includes ensuring that the 
defendants are legally liable for the satisfactory completion of the SEP.91 
In addition, the EPA has the responsibility of overseeing the 
implementation of the SEP and taking legal action if the SEP is not 
satisfactorily completed by the defendant.92  
 
 
 83. “SEPs which perform well on this factor will have been developed taking into consideration 
input received from the affected community.” Id. The community input factor has recently been 
emphasized by the EPA. Id. at 24,803 (“In appropriate cases, EPA should make special efforts to seek 
input on project proposals from the local community that may have been adversely impacted by the 
violations.”). Gathering community input when developing the SEP can “[r]esult in SEPs that better 
address the needs of the impacted community; promote environmental justice; produce better 
community understanding of EPA enforcement; and improve relations between the community and the 
violating facility.” Id. 
 84. “SEPs which perform well on this factor will reduce emissions to more than one medium.” 
Id. at 24,802. 
 85. “SEPs which perform well on this factor will develop and implement pollution prevention 
techniques and practices.” Id. (emphasis added). 
 86. Id. 
 87. Id. 
 88. Id. 
 89. Id. 
 90. Id. 
 91. The defendant is allowed to use contractors to complete the SEP, but the defendant may not 
transfer the legal liability for ensuring the SEP’s completion to the contractors. Id.  
 92. Id. at 24,803. 
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II. WHY ARE SEPS UNDERUTILIZED? 
A. The EPA’s Policy Encouraging the Use of SEPs 
The EPA has announced a clear policy on encouraging and expanding 
the use of SEPs in the settlement of enforcement actions.93 On June 11, 
2003, the EPA released a memorandum to encourage EPA enforcement 
staff to include SEPs in the settlement of enforcement actions whenever 
possible.94 In an effort to increase the use of SEPs in settlements, the EPA 
attempted to simplify SEP policy and created an SEP library, which 
includes potential project ideas generated by EPA staff.95 The EPA 
promotes the use of SEPs because they further the objectives of the 
environmental statutes and the policy goals of the EPA.96 SEPs “protect 
and enhance public health and the environment,”97 and provide a means 
for the settlement penalties to be used to correct environmental damage 
rather than being placed in the general treasury fund.98  
B. The Underutilization of SEPs 
Despite the EPA’s policy on encouraging the use of SEPs in 
settlements, only a small percentage of settlements of enforcement actions 
actually include SEPs.99 From 1992 to 2006, less than twelve percent of 
the settlements contained SEPs.100 The annual SEP utilization rate has 
 
 
 93. Expanding the Use of SEPs Memo, supra note 1, at 1. 
 94. Id. 
 95. The EPA is “launching an effort to simplify the SEP Policy, and [is] piloting a SEP library 
which will serve as a clearinghouse for possible SEPs.” Id. at 2. An SEP library will provide many 
benefits. “First, [it will] ensure that projects actually redound to the benefit of local communities by 
soliciting community group proposals.” Steven Bonorris et al., Environmental Enforcement in the Fifty 
States: The Promise and Pitfalls of Supplemental Environmental Projects, 11 HASTINGS W.-Nw. J. 
ENVTL. L. & POL’Y 185, 214 (2005). An SEP library will allow community groups to identify 
environmental projects that the community most needs and the benefits they offer. “Second, the 
proposals reduce transaction costs for all parties, as there is no need to make under-informed and 
uncertain predictions about the risks and benefits of projects as they arise in the course of settlement 
negotiations.” Id. Violators may select a project from the library without having to expend the 
resources to come up with an SEP idea on their own.  
 96. See 1998 SEP Policy, supra note 2, at 24,797. 
 97. Id. at 24,796. 
 98. In United States v. Smithfield Foods, Inc., 982 F. Supp. 373, 375 (E.D. Va. 1997), one court 
opined, “as a matter of public policy, simply depositing civil penalties into the vast reaches of the 
United States Treasury does not seem to be the most effective way of combating environmental 
problems caused by a specific polluter.” However, the court went on to hold that the court must 
enforce the law as it was passed by Congress, which required the monetary penalty to be paid into the 
Treasury once it had been deemed a penalty by the court. Id. at 375–76.  
 99. Kristl, supra note 21, at 219. 
 100. Id. at 243. 
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been declining since 1995,101 which is when the EPA amended the SEP 
policy to tighten the nexus requirement and reduced the mitigation 
percentage ceiling to 80%.102 The full potential of SEPs has yet to be 
realized.103 There are several factors that have led to this underutilization 
of SEPs. In recent article, Professor Kenneth Kristl suggests that the two 
most important factors that have led to underutilization are the nexus 
requirement and the mitigation percentage.104  
The 1998 SEP Policy’s strict nexus requirement prevents the use of 
SEPs in several settlements. Nexus is the relationship between the SEP 
and the violation.105 Fewer projects meet this requirement as the EPA 
requires a closer relationship between the SEP and the violation.106 In 
some situations, there is simply no feasible project that will meet the 
narrow nexus requirement of the SEP policy. The EPA issued a 
memorandum in 2002 emphasizing the importance of the nexus 
requirement;107 however, the concept of nexus was not adequately 
explained.108 The enforcement staff continued to have difficulty applying 
the nexus concept to proposed projects.109  
In 2002, the EPA released a memo on the “Importance of the Nexus 
Requirement in Supplemental Environmental Projects.”110 The memo 
warns agency officials that an adequate nexus is important because it 
ensures that the EPA is in compliance with the MRA. The memo goes on 
 
 
 101.  
[T]he annual utilization rate [of SEPs] has been steadily declining since 1995, with only a 
temporary stabilization in the 8% range during FY 2004–2005. This decline has occurred 
despite the consistent pronouncements of EPA since the 1995 SEP Policy that the agency 
wants to encourage and increase the use of SEPs. The data clearly show that ten years of these 
pronouncements have had no apparent effect on SEP utilization. 
Id. at 245. 
 102. 1995 SEP Policy, supra note 34, at 24,858, 24,861. 
 103. See Expanding the Use of SEPs Memo, supra note 1, at 1. 
 104. Kristl, supra note 21, at 220. This Note agrees with Professor Kristl’s argument that the 
nexus requirement should be relaxed and the mitigation percentage increased. It expands on these 
ideas by proposing the creation of an Environmental Trust and permitting the use of third-party 
contractors.  
 105. 1998 SEP Policy, supra note 2, at 24,798. 
 106. Kristl, supra note 21, at 220. 
 107. Memorandum from Walker B. Smith, Director, Office of Regulatory Enforcement, Envtl. 
Prot. Agency, to Reg’l Counsel et al. 1 (Oct. 31, 2002), available at http://www.epa.gov/compliance/ 
resources/policies/civil/seps/sepnexus-mem.pdf [hereinafter Nexus Memo].  
 108. In its June 2003 memo, the EPA noted that “several Regional and Headquarters offices raised 
questions about the complexity of the existing SEP Policy. Specifically, [they] heard a number of 
questions concerning how to define an appropriate nexus in certain situations . . . .” Expanding the Use 
of SEPs Memo, supra note 1, at 3.  
 109. See id. 
 110. Nexus Memo, supra note 107, at 2.  
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to explain the penalties for violating the MRA.111 They include “removal 
from office and, in some cases, personal liability for the amount of money 
misappropriated.”112 If there is a relationship between the SEP and the 
violation, the memo states that the EPA can reduce the penalty.113 If the 
nexus requirement is not met, then the memo claims that the EPA does not 
have the discretion to reduce the penalty.114 These types of warnings likely 
cause EPA officials to enforce a strict nexus requirement which 
discourages the use of SEPs. The risks of removal from their position and 
personal liability for the money misappropriated are severe and probably 
encourage EPA officials to be very cautious with their approval of SEPs. 
In order to avoid failing to comply with the nexus requirement, EPA 
officials and defendants are likely inclined to undertake projects that have 
been completed by other defendants, or worse, steer clear of utilizing SEPs 
altogether.115 This stifles the creation of new forms of SEPs that could 
potentially lead to increased environmental benefits.  
The 80% ceiling the SEP policy places on the mitigation percentage is 
perhaps the largest contributor to the underutilization of SEPs.116 If the 
EPA calculates a $100 settlement penalty for a violation, the defendant is 
presented with two options. The defendant can agree to perform an SEP 
that will cost $100 and pay a $20 settlement penalty (since only 80% of 
the SEP cost can be used to mitigate the settlement penalty).117 
Alternatively, the defendant can simply pay the $100 settlement penalty.118 
Thus, the defendant must pay a total of $120 when the SEP is included in 
the settlement, but must only pay a total of $100 if the SEP is not included. 
Assuming most defendants are rational economic actors, they will choose 
the less expensive option. The SEP policy creates “a built-in economic 
disincentive to undertake SEPs by making the dollars spent on SEPs less 
valuable than dollars simply paid as penalties.”119  
 
 
 111. Id. 
 112. Id. 
 113. Id. 
 114. Id. 
 115. Kristl, supra note 21, at 241. 
Without clear guidance on what nexus really is, Agency personnel and defendants are likely 
to “play it safe” and choose projects that have been approved before or simply avoid SEPs 
altogether instead of exploring new ways of utilizing SEPs that might in fact be at the outer 
limits of nexus.  
Id. 
 116. See id. at 220. 
 117. See 1998 SEP Policy, supra note 2, at 24,801. 
 118. See id. 
 119. See Kristl, supra note 21, at 262. 
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Another reason a settlement may not include an SEP is that it may not 
be feasible. The settlement amount may be too small to develop and carry 
out an SEP in some cases.120 The current SEP policy requires the 
defendant to propose a project that meets all the SEP requirements and to 
be responsible for implementing the SEP.121 Some defendants may be 
unable to identify a project that meets the SEP policy requirements or may 
not have the expertise and resources necessary to implement an SEP.  
III. CREATION OF AN ENVIRONMENTAL TRUST, ALERATION OF 
MITIGATION PERCENTAGE AND NEXUS, AND UTILIZATION OF THIRD-
PARTY CONTRACTORS 
The EPA’s current SEP policy could be improved by taking three 
steps: creating and managing an Environmental Trust that would be used 
to complete SEPs, increasing the mitigation percentage to 100% and 
relaxing the nexus requirement, and allowing third-party contractors to bid 
on and carry out SEP contracts. These changes would likely lead to an 
increase in the use of SEPs in the settlement of enforcement actions, 
higher quality SEPS, and the more efficient use of SEP dollars. The EPA’s 
goals to “protect and enhance public health and the environment”122 would 
be better served by implementing these changes. 
Although the EPA explicitly states that it cannot establish SEP 
accounts in order to hold or manage SEP funds,123 this Note contends that 
the EPA should abandon this policy and create an Environmental Trust.124 
The Environmental Trust would accept the settlement penalty agreed upon 
 
 
 120. Id. at 244. 
 121. 1998 SEP Policy, supra note 2. 
 122. Id. at 24,796. 
 123.  
[The Office of Enforcement and Compliance Assurance] has had several inquiries into the 
feasibility of establishing SEP “banks” or accounts for pooling the funds applied towards 
SEPs. Specifically, the question is whether EPA may hold and manage, in one account, SEP 
funds from several settlements that would otherwise have been used by 
defendants/respondents for SEP projects in each individual enforcement settlement. While the 
aggregation of SEP funds may result in a SEP with greater public health or environmental 
benefits than several smaller funds, we have been advised by OGC that the MRA prohibits 
EPA from managing SEP funds.  
Memorandum from John Peter Suarez, Assistant Adm’r, Envtl. Prot. Agency, to Reg’l Counsels 
(Region 1-x) et al. 3 (Dec. 15, 2003), http://www.epa.gov/compliance/resources/policies/civil/seps/ 
seps-thirdparties.pdf [hereinafter Third Party and Aggregation Memo].  
 124. See Executive Office of Energy and Environmental Affairs, MET Overview, 
http://www.mass.gov/eea/met (follow “MET Overview” hyperlink) (last visited Nov. 15, 2008) for an 
explanation of how the Massachusetts Environmental Trust operates and a potential model for the 
EPA’s Environmental Trust. 
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by the EPA and the violator. In addition, the Environmental Trust could 
accept voluntary contributions from the public. The settlement penalty 
should continue to be determined just as explained by the 1998 SEP 
Policy—adding the dollar value of the economic benefit the defendant 
gained from noncompliance and an amount based on the gravity of the 
violation.125 The defendant would simply pay the settlement amount 
directly into the EPA’s Environmental Trust; the EPA would never be 
given the payment. The EPA would manage the Environmental Trust for 
the public. The EPA or a third-party contractor would then come up with 
an SEP for that specific settlement, and the money in the Environmental 
Trust would be used to carry out the SEP. In the event that an SEP is not 
feasible (e.g., if the settlement amount is too small), the money would be 
left in the Environmental Trust and would be used for future projects.  
The mitigation percentage should be increased to 100%. With the 
creation of the Environmental Trust, there is no justification for a 
mitigation percentage below 100%. The defendant no longer carries out 
the SEP. The defendant simply pays the settlement penalty directly into 
the Environmental Trust as opposed to the Treasury. In order to increase 
the use of SEPs in settlements, the mitigation percentage must be 100%. 
Any lower percentage creates an economic disincentive to choose the SEP 
option. Assuming defendants behave rationally, they will choose the least 
costly option. 
There are several reasons that may explain why the EPA has placed an 
80% ceiling on the mitigation percentage.126 However, these reasons are 
no longer justified under this new proposal. The EPA may believe the 
defendant receives some economic benefit from doing an SEP (e.g., the 
SEP actually costs the defendant less to complete than the defendant 
reports that it will cost).127 If the suggested changes are implemented, this 
problem no longer justifies the 80% cap. If a third-party contractor carries 
out the SEP instead of the defendant, this eliminates the risk that the SEP 
will end up costing the defendant less than the reported cost. The 
defendant loses the power to overstate the costs if a third-party contractor 
proposes and carries out the SEP.  
The EPA may also believe that the defendant benefits from 
implementing the SEP by gaining goodwill and creating a positive public 
image.128 However, the 1998 SEP Policy addresses this concern by 
 
 
 125. 1998 SEP Policy, supra note 2, at 24,801. 
 126. Id. at 24,802. 
 127. Bonorris et al., supra note 95, at 206. 
 128. Kristl, supra note 21, at 263; DOJ Statement, supra note 22, at 30. 
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requiring that whenever a defendant “publicizes a SEP or the results of a 
SEP, it will state in a prominent manner that the project is being 
undertaken as part of the settlement of an enforcement action.”129 
Therefore any benefit is likely minimal. Furthermore, if the changes 
proposed above are implemented, the EPA (or possibly the third-party 
contractor) will get the public image benefit. The defendant is taken out of 
the picture and will no longer stand to benefit from any goodwill that is 
created from implementing the SEP. 
It is also possible that the EPA believes that “SEP dollars simply do not 
have the same deterrent effect as penalty dollars.”130 Most defendants are 
rational economic actors and will choose the option that is least costly to 
them. It does not matter whether the dollar is spent on an SEP or paid 
directly to the Treasury. If there is any truth to this idea that money spent 
by defendants to implement an SEP does not have the same deterrent 
effect, it is remedied by requiring the defendants to pay the settlement 
amount directly into the Environmental Trust instead of allowing them to 
keep the money and spend it to implement the project themselves.  
Finally, the EPA currently uses the mitigation percentage to encourage 
and reward projects of outstanding quality.131 There is a policy exception 
that allows the mitigation percentage to be 100% if the SEP implements 
pollution prevention and the defendant can demonstrate that the project is 
of outstanding quality.132 Under the new changes, there is no need to 
require a mitigation percentage of less than 100% for each project, since 
there is no longer a need to encourage or reward a defendant who develops 
a project of outstanding quality. The EPA or third-party contractors will be 
in charge of developing the projects. The third-party contractor with the 
best project idea will be chosen by the EPA to carry out the SEP; 
therefore, the market will create the incentive to develop projects of 
outstanding quality.  
In addition, the nexus requirement should be eliminated, or at least 
relaxed, in order to expand the use of SEPs.133 If the EPA continues to 
require a strict relationship between the violation and the SEP, then an 
exception should be created for violations where an SEP is not feasible. If 
an SEP is not viable (e.g., the settlement penalty is too small or the EPA 
 
 
 129. See 1998 SEP Policy, supra note 2, at 24,803. 
 130. Kristl, supra note 21, at 263. 
 131. See 1998 SEP Policy, supra note 2, at 24,802. 
 132. Id.  
 133. See Bonorris et al., supra note 95, at 212 (arguing that some commentators advise that the 
EPA should relax the nexus requirement so as not to impede SEPs that could promote environmental 
justice).  
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could not come up with a suitable project), then the nexus requirement 
should be dropped, and the payments should simply be placed in the 
Environmental Trust.  
Finally, the EPA should utilize third-party contractors.134 The 
defendant would pay the settlement penalty directly into the 
Environmental Trust. The EPA would then match the violation with one of 
its project ideas and announce the project to the public. Third-party 
contractors could then bid against each other in an effort to secure the 
contract to carry out the SEP (much like other government contracts) with 
the lowest bidder securing the contract. If the EPA is unable to come up 
with a suitable project idea, third-party organizations would be allowed to 
come forward with proposals.  
IV. EPA’S AUTHORITY TO IMPLEMENT PROPOSED CHANGES 
The EPA has the authority to create an Environmental Trust, increase 
the mitigation percentage, relax the nexus requirement, and use third-party 
contractors to carry out SEPs. The following sections will explain why the 
EPA has the authority to make each of these changes. In addition, even if 
the EPA does not have the authority to make these changes, Congress 
should expressly authorize these changes to the 1998 SEP Policy. The 
changes will improve the SEP policy and will lead to the greater use of 
SEPs in the settlement of enforcement actions. This will in turn lead to 
more environmental benefits. 
A. Creating an Environmental Trust 
The EPA has issued a memorandum stating that it cannot hold and 
manage SEP funds in one account, because according to the Office of 
General Counsel (OGC), this practice would violate the MRA and 
appropriations laws.135 Therefore, the creation of an Environmental Trust 
is prohibited.136 This Note contends that the OGC incorrectly interpreted 
 
 
 134. The EPA addressed the use of third-party contractors in the December 2003 memorandum.  
An alleged violator could use a private organization to recommend SEPs to it during 
negotiations with the Agency, and then to manage a SEP, as long as (1) the 
defendant/respondent is obligated under the settlement document to complete the project 
satisfactorily, (2) the defendant/respondent fully expends the amount of funds agreed to be 
spent in the performance of the SEP, and (3) the project meets all of the conditions and 
requirements of the SEP Policy.  
Third Party and Aggregation Memo, supra note 123, at 4. 
 135. Id. at 3. 
 136. See id. 
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the Miscellaneous Receipts Act and appropriations laws and incorrectly 
advised the EPA that they prohibited the EPA from managing SEP funds.  
The MRA provides that “an official or agent of the Government 
receiving money for the Government from any source shall deposit the 
money in the Treasury as soon as practicable without deduction for any 
charge or claim.”137 In order to trigger the MRA, a government agent must 
receive money for the government. The current SEP policy does not 
violate the MRA, because the SEP funds are never received by any EPA 
agent.138 The funds stay with the defendant who agrees to use the money 
to implement the SEP agreed upon in the settlement.139 Similarly, the 
Environmental Trust does not violate the MRA. In the Environmental 
Trust situation, the EPA agent never actually receives the SEP funds 
either; the funds go directly from the defendant to the Environmental 
Trust, which the EPA manages for the public. In addition, the funds cannot 
be considered “money for the government”; the funds are for the SEP and 
are held in the Environmental Trust until the SEP is carried out.140 If the 
current SEP policy does not violate the MRA, then the Environmental 
Trust does not either.141 
The Office of Legal Counsel issued an opinion on the proposed 
settlement of In re Complaint of Steuart Transportation Co., which further 
clarified the type of settlement that violates the MRA.142 In Steuart, a 
claim was brought against an oil company for an oil spill that occurred in 
the Chesapeake Bay.143 The claim was settled.144 One of the terms of the 
 
 
 137. 31 U.S.C. § 3302 (b) (2000). 
 138.  
Use of SEPs is acceptable since they are provided for within the substantive statutes, outside 
the requirements of the MRA and the ADA, legal as an out-of-court agreement incorporated 
into a consent decree, simply a consideration in the application of the EPA Civil Penalty 
Policy, and accepted by Congress through its acquiescence and support.  
Droughton, supra note 31, at 812.  
 139. Kristl, supra note 21, at 255.  
 140. “[W]here a governmental body holds money in trusteeship for a class of persons affected by 
the statutory or regulatory violations, it need not deposit such money into the Treasury.” Droughton, 
supra note 31, at 816–17. 
 141. Congress is well aware of the EPA’s use of SEPs and has displayed congressional 
acquiescence for their use. Id. at 822. It could be argued that since the Environmental Trust is set up by 
the EPA, it is as though the money went through the EPA’s hands. In addition, since the EPA would 
manage the Trust, it could be argued that the EPA would, in effect, be directing the funds in violation 
of the MRA. If there is still doubt as to whether the Environmental Trust would violate the MRA, 
Congress should draft a statute that authorizes the EPA to use the Environmental Trust. “[W]here 
specific statutory authority exists to retain collected funds or to hand such funds differently, the MRA 
is inapplicable.” Id. at 817.  
 142. 4 Op. Off. Legal Counsel 684 (1980). 
 143. Id. at 685. 
 144. Id.  
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settlement required the oil company to give money to a waterfowl 
preservation organization.145 The Office of Legal Counsel found that this 
settlement term violated the MRA.146 This was its conclusion, despite the 
fact that no money was ever received by a government agent.147 “[I]f a 
federal agency could have accepted possession and retains discretion to 
direct the use of the money,” it does not matter if any money is received 
by a federal official.148 This is still a violation of the MRA.149  
Even though this opinion broadens the reach of the MRA, the 
Environmental Trust is still compatible with the MRA. First, the 
settlement money goes directly into the Environmental Trust; the EPA 
cannot accept possession of the money. Second, the EPA retains no more 
discretion to direct the use of the money after it is placed in the 
Environmental Trust than it does when the money is held by the 
defendant. Currently, the defendant uses the money to perform an SEP. 
The EPA oversees this performance and can take action if the SEP is not 
satisfactorily performed. Under the proposal, the money would go directly 
to the Environmental Trust, a project would be chosen, and the EPA 
would ensure that the project is satisfactorily performed. Neither the 
current policy nor the proposed change in policy violates the MRA.  
Courts have held that that the MRA requires all penalties to be paid 
into the Treasury.150 However, payments involved in a settlement are not 
delineated as penalties. “It is precisely before liability is determined that 
most settlements take place, and thus the caselaw exempts SEP payments 
from the category of penalties and thus from the purview of the MRA.”151 
In the same way, the Environmental Trust payments would be exempted 
from the category of penalties. The settlements out of which Trust 
 
 
 145. Id. A number of migratory waterfowl were killed in the oil spill. One part of the claim that 
the federal government brought against the oil company was for the death of these waterfowl. 
 146. Id. at 684. 
 147. Id. at 688. 
 148. Id. 
 149. Id. 
 150. Kristl, supra note 21, at n.212. See Gwaltney of Smithfield, Ltd. v. Chesapeake Bay Found., 
484 U.S. 49, 53 (1987) (“If the citizen prevails in such an action, the court may order injunctive relief 
and/or impose civil penalties payable to the United States Treasury.”); Pub. Interest Research Group of 
New Jersey, Inc. v. Powell Duffryn Terminals, Inc., 913 F.2d 64, 81 (3d Cir. 1990) (“Congress 
intended that any penalties assessed in a citizen suit be treated as ‘miscellaneous receipts.’ Under the 
Miscellaneous Receipts Act, any person having custody of such public funds must deposit them in the 
Treasury within three days of receipt.”); Sierra Club, Inc. v. Elec. Controls Design, Inc., 909 F.2d 
1350, 1354 (9th Cir. 1990) (“We agree with the district court that if the payments required under the 
proposed consent decree are civil penalties within the meaning of the Clean Water Act, they may be 
paid only to the U.S. treasury.”).  
 151. Kristl, supra note 21, at 257.  
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payments would come would take place before liability is determined; 
thus the payments would not be considered penalties. 
The Appropriations Clause of the Constitution provides that only 
Congress can appropriate funds for a federal agency.152 Again, if the 
current SEP policy does not violate this provision, then the Environmental 
Trust does not either. There is no difference between the EPA determining 
that the settlement money can be spent on the implementation of an 
approved SEP instead of being paid to the Treasury, and the EPA 
determining that the settlement money can be placed in an Environmental 
Trust that will later be used to implement an approved SEP.  
B. Increasing the Mitigation Percentage 
It is clear that the EPA has the authority to allow any mitigation 
percentage that it chooses. Currently, the EPA only allows 80% of the 
penalty to be offset by the SEP cost.153 In the past, the EPA has allowed 
for the entire penalty to be offset by the SEP cost.154 Since the EPA has 
previously allowed a 100% mitigation percentage and its authority has not 
been diminished, it follows that it still has the authority to increase the 
mitigation percentage to 100%.  
C. Relaxing the Nexus Requirement 
In its 2002 memo, the EPA states that the nexus requirement must be 
met to avoid violating the MRA: “If there is a relationship between the 
alleged violation and the SEP, then it is within the Agency’s discretion to 
take the SEP into account as a mitigating factor when determining the 
amount” of the settlement penalty.155 “If there is no nexus,” the memo 
claims, “then the Agency does not have that discretion.”156 This 
interpretation of the MRA is incorrect. The nexus requirement is not 
needed to avoid violating the MRA. The necessary requirement is that the 
money for the project is never given to the EPA; it is simply spent on the 
SEP. It does not matter whether the SEP has a strict nexus requirement or 
no nexus requirement at all. In both situations, the money for the SEP 
 
 
 152. “No Money shall be drawn from the Treasury, but in Consequence of Appropriations made 
by Law; and a regular Statement and Account of the Receipts and Expenditures of all public Money 
shall be published from time to time.” U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9, cl. 7. 
 153. 1998 SEP Policy, supra note 2. 
 154. 1991 SEP Policy, supra note 32. 
 155. Nexus Memo, supra note 107, at 2. 
 156. Id. 
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never falls into the hands of the EPA. The MRA never comes into play in 
either situation.157  
There is also no statutory source of the nexus requirement. There are 
no federal environmental statutes that expressly contain a nexus 
requirement for SEPs.158 The Clean Air Act is the only environmental 
statute that evens mentions SEPs in general.159 In addition, SEPs are “parts 
of settlements, and the strictures of the statute involved do not limit the 
terms of a settlement under the statute.”160 Professor Kristl notes that 
“[n]othing in the settlement context gives rise to a legal requirement of 
nexus.”161 
D. Utilizing Third-Party Contractors 
The EPA also prohibits defendants from simply making cash payments 
to third-party contractors “conducting a project without retaining full 
responsibility for the implementation or completion of the project, as this 
appears to violate the MRA.”162 The creation of the Environmental Trust 
keeps the defendant from simply making a cash payment to a third-party 
contractor. Instead, the defendant makes a payment directly into the 
Environmental Trust, which is then used to pay the contractor.  
The EPA notes that allowing third-party contractors to implement the 
SEPs creates some legal difficulties.163 First, the EPA is concerned that 
working closely with a third-party contractor to carry out an SEP might 
“create the appearance that EPA is using the organization as a means to 
indirectly manage or direct SEP funds.”164 Under the proposal, this 
concern is no longer relevant. The money goes directly into the 
Environmental Trust, which is used to carry out the SEPs. The EPA never 
receives or directs the funds; it simply manages the Environmental Trust. 
 
 
 157. 31 U.S.C. § 3302 (2000). 
 158. Kristl, supra note 21, at 247.  
 159. Id. 
 160. Id. at 248 (emphasis omitted). 
 161. Id. at 249. 
 162. Third Party and Aggregation Memo, supra note 123, at 4. The current policy regarding the 
use of third-party organizations to manage SEPs or SEP funds is very strict. The EPA acknowledges 
that “[p]rivate organizations that are developing libraries of projects and offering project and funds 
management, project implementation, and oversight services can play a valuable role in SEPs.” Id. 
(emphasis omitted). However, a defendant can only use third-party contractors to assist in carrying out 
SEPs. A defendant can utilize a third-party contractor as long as the defendant retains the 
responsibility of ensuring the project is satisfactorily completed, the defendant spends the agreed upon 
amount of funds to carry out the SEP, and the SEP meets all of the requirements of the SEP policy. Id. 
 163. Id. at 5. 
 164. Id. 
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A second concern is that “there are ethical restrictions on endorsing or 
otherwise providing private organizations with unfair competitive 
advantages in selling their SEP management and implementation services 
to defendants/respondents.”165 Again, this is not an issue under the 
proposal. The third-party contractors would bid against each other to 
receive the contract. This removes any concerns regarding unfair 
competitive advantages.  
V. IMPLEMENTING CHANGES WILL IMPROVE THE EPA’S CURRENT SEP 
POLICY 
Although the current SEP policy has led to substantial environmental 
benefits, it is underutilized and could be improved.166 The EPA should 
create an Environmental Trust and use it to complete SEPs. It should 
increase the mitigation percentage to 100% and relax the nexus 
requirement. Finally, the EPA should allow third-party contractors to bid 
on and complete SEP contracts. These changes would make SEPs a viable 
option for more defendants, thus increasing their usage.167 The proposal 
would also allow SEPs to be conducted more efficiently and utilized to 
address the most pressing environmental problems. In addition, many of 
the problems experienced under the current SEP policy would be remedied 
by adopting the proposed changes. 
A. Increased Utilization of SEPs 
The EPA’s current SEP policy contains a nexus requirement that 
creates an impediment for many possible SEPs.168 Eliminating or at least 
relaxing the nexus requirement169 would make SEPs an acceptable option 
 
 
 165. Id. 
 166. See Expanding the Use of SEPs Memo, supra note 1, at 1.  
 167. An alternative to this proposal is the use of environmental grants to encourage 
environmentally beneficial projects. Some opponents of SEPs “argue that government grants (financed 
out of an environmental penalty fund, as in Delaware) to regulated entities for environmentally 
beneficial projects would be a better means of promoting environmentally beneficial projects and 
would not weaken deterrence.” Bonorris et al., supra note 95, at 208. The grant program would allow 
agency officials to screen out projects that would not maximize environmental benefit per dollar. “By 
only accepting projects that offer a higher rate of environmental return, ‘regulators conserve resources 
in their limited grant budget for more promising projects’ and help ensure that SEPs redound to the 
public benefit.” Id. (quoting David Dana, The Uncertain Merits of Environmental Enforcement 
Reform: The Case of SEPs, 1998 WIS. L. REV. 1181, 1216). 
 168. 1998 SEP Policy, supra note 2, at 24,798. 
 169. Although this Note argues that the nexus requirement should be reduced or eliminated, there 
are arguments in favor of keeping the nexus requirement that must be noted. Professor Kristl suggests 
that there may be political reasons for requiring that the SEP be related to the violation. “From a 
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for a greater number of settlements.170 This would lead to greater 
environmental benefits. The 80% cap on the allowable mitigation 
percentage also reduces the number of SEPs used in settlements.171 
Increasing the mitigation percentage to 100% would eliminate the 
economic disincentive to defendants to include SEPs in their settlements 
and would also lead to greater environmental benefits.172 
B. Aggregation of Funds 
Under the current SEP policy, funds from different settlements cannot 
be aggregated and used to complete larger environmental projects.173 The 
creation of the Environmental Trust and the reduction of the nexus 
requirement would allow for aggregation of funds. This would allow 
companies with violations that only require a small settlement amount to 
still choose the SEP option, even though the amount could not fund a 
 
 
political perspective, an affected population is the most likely to react positively or negatively to the 
settlement of a violation, and a SEP that adequately addresses that population’s injuries or interests no 
doubt increases the chance of a positive reaction.” Kristl, supra note 21, at 259. However, Professor 
Kristl argues that this is a political reason, not a legal one, and there is no legal requirement of nexus. 
Id. 
 In addition, there are fairness concerns associated with the nexus requirement. By requiring that 
SEPs be connected to the violation, the ecosystem and community that was harmed are restored. Id. 
Low-income and minority populations are disproportionately affected by pollution. 1998 SEP Policy, 
supra note 2, at 24,797. Environmental violations often occur in communities where these segments of 
the nation’s population reside. “Emphasizing SEPs in communities where environmental justice 
concerns are present helps ensure that persons who spend significant portions of their time in areas, or 
depend on food and water sources located near, where the violations occur would be protected.” Id. 
Eliminating nexus may reduce the restorative justice benefits of SEPs.  
 In response to these concerns, projects will be created to address the injuries that resulted from the 
violation when possible. It is only in situations where the amount of the penalty is too small to carry 
out an SEP or no project is able to be generated that meets the nexus requirement that the funds will be 
spent on other environmental problems. Under the current SEP policy, when the penalty amount is too 
small or no project meets the SEP requirements, the money is not used to address the injuries of the 
population affected either. Currently, the money is placed into the Treasury. Therefore, eliminating the 
nexus requirement will not cause fewer projects to be devoted to restoring those affected by the 
violation. The only difference between the current SEP policy and the proposal is that when a project 
is unable to meet the nexus requirement under the proposal, the money will be used on another 
environmental project instead of being placed into the Treasury. In cases where the money is 
aggregated and a project of pressing importance is implemented instead, it is likely that the affected 
citizens will still react favorably to the EPA’s project decision. 
 170. Kristl, supra note 21, at 220 (“[T]he nexus requirement is a restraint on SEP utilization 
. . . .”). 
 171. 1998 SEP Policy, supra note 2, at 24,802. 
 172. Kristl, supra note 21, at 220 (“[O]fficial EPA policy requires a defendant who wants to 
perform [an] SEP to pay more than the defendant would if it were simply paying a penalty alone. This 
economic disincentive likely creates a restraint on SEP utilization.”). 
 173. Third Party and Aggregation Memo, supra note 123, at 2. 
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project on its own.174 Aggregation would also allow the EPA to undertake 
larger and more beneficial projects. Instead of using the funds in a 
piecemeal fashion, the EPA could opt to aggregate the funds and 
undertake a project “on a regional or national basis.”175 This could lead to 
more environmental benefit per SEP dollar. In addition, there may be 
environmental projects of pressing importance at various times. The 
creation of the Environmental Trust and elimination of the nexus 
requirement would allow the EPA to address the most important 
environmental concerns first.176 This could prevent more costly 
environmental harm in the future. 
C. Improved Project Ideas 
The defendants have the responsibility to come up with their project 
ideas under the current SEP policy.177 Allowing the EPA or third-party 
contractors to develop the project ideas will be more efficient than 
allowing the defendants to come up with their own ideas in most 
situations.178 Defendants are motivated by their own self-interest, and their 
goal in coming up with a project is likely to minimize the detriment to 
themselves instead of maximizing environmental benefit. The EPA 
already has a library of ideas; therefore, having the EPA instead of the 
defendants come up with the ideas would not require an unreasonable 
amount of resources to be expended by the EPA.179 The EPA will likely 
come up with better ideas, because it is more aware of possible options for 
 
 
 174. Kristl, supra note 21, at 260 (“[A]ggregation can produce additional benefits by providing 
‘increased leverage’ for larger environmental benefits and the opportunity for defendants ‘in smaller 
cases to take advantage of the SEP Policy.’”) (quoting Third Party and Aggregation Memo, supra note 
123, at 2). 
 175. Id. at 261. 
 176. Id. at 260 (“The broader range of possibilities would also give EPA planning or 
administrative options that could result in coordinated . . . benefits in areas needing assistance. For 
example, one could envision a coordinated effort to use SEP aggregation in an area devastated by a 
natural disaster.”). 
 177. 1998 SEP Policy, supra note 2. 
 178. See Lloyd, supra note 19, at 433.  
 179. See Memorandum from Granta Y. Nakayama, Assistant Adm’r, Envtl. Prot. Agency, to 
Assistant Adm’rs et al. (July 20, 2006), available at http://www.epa.gov/oecaerth/resources/policies/ 
civil/seps/potentialproject-seps0607.pdf [hereinafter Project Ideas Memo]. The following are some 
examples of EPA project ideas: “[o]perate and maintain health clinics serving low income and 
minority communities and sensitive populations;” conduct lead-based paint abatement for low income 
housing; purchase emissions credits and retire them; purchase and install fuel cells; pave roads to 
reduce “dust and particulate matter from unpaved” surfaces; replace gasoline-powered vehicles with 
alternative fuel or hybrid vehicles; restore migratory bird or endangered species habitat; purchase land 
and maintain it as a green buffer or conservation easement; implement green engineering methods, 
create recycling centers; and install “water systems that reuse wastewater or greywater.” Id. at 3–9. 
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projects. It knows the areas of environmental concern that are the most 
pressing, and the EPA has more expertise and experience in environmental 
issues than most defendants will have. In addition, allowing third-party 
organizations, who specialize in environmental projects, to come up with 
ideas will likely lead to increased idea generation as well as higher quality 
projects.180  
D. Deprivation of Goodwill and Interest 
This proposal also leads to the deprivation of goodwill for the 
defendant that might result from carrying out an SEP, and eliminates the 
possible accumulation of interest that would be put toward additional 
environmental projects. If the EPA or a third-party contractor implements 
the SEPs, then the EPA or third-party contractor will derive any goodwill 
or public image boost that may result from the project being carried out. 
Another obvious benefit that would result from the Environmental Trust 
would be the interest that accrues (assuming some of the funds were left in 
the Trust instead of being used to fund a project right away). The current 
SEP policy leaves the money in the hands of the defendant. This reduces 
the amount of the penalty by the interest earned over the period of time the 
SEP is implemented. The defendant should not get this benefit.  
E. Increased Efficiency of SEPs  
Currently, defendant companies implement their own SEPs.181 
Allowing third-party organizations to bid against each other to carry out 
the SEPs ensures that the maximum amount of environmental benefit is 
realized from every SEP dollar. The third-party organizations will be 
specialized in implementing SEPs and will likely be able to carry out the 
projects for a lower price than the defendant may have been able to.182 
 
 
 180. There is a possible counterargument to this statement. The defendant company will likely 
have more knowledge about its unique operations and about the violation that occurred. This intimate 
knowledge might place defendants in a better position to come up with project ideas and to implement 
the SEP. This proposal is not suggesting that the defendant should be prohibited from offering project 
ideas. In addition, the third-party contractors would be able to gather information about the operations 
and violation of the defendant company. If a defendant company is uniquely suited to implement its 
SEP, it is possible that the defendant could bid on its own SEP contract. The details of this 
arrangement are beyond the scope of this Note; however, the defendant company would presumably 
have to pay some neutral third party (such as the EPA or a third-party contractor) to oversee the 
implementation of the SEP. 
 181. 1998 SEP Policy, supra note 2. 
 182. That is unless the defendant company’s intimate knowledge of their operations and violation 
allow it to complete the project at a lower price. See supra note 180. 
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This will also increase the likelihood that the projects are carried out in the 
most efficient manner possible. There are already “[p]rivate organizations 
that are developing libraries of projects and offering project . . . 
management, project implementation, and oversight services.”183 In 
addition, the EPA has already acquiesced to defendants’ use of third-party 
organizations as contractors or consultants to assist in the implementation 
of an SEP.184 This shows that the EPA recognizes the benefits that third-
party contractors can offer to the SEP program. 
F. Strengthen Current SEP Policy 
Several weaknesses of the current SEP policy could be strengthened by 
this proposal. Under the current SEP policy, a defendant company could 
simply carry out an environmental project they had already intended to 
carry out before the violation.185 This would mean that the defendant 
would be able to side step the punishment for the violation altogether. 
Requiring the defendant to pay the settlement amount into the 
Environmental Trust, and then having the EPA or a third-party 
organization come up with an SEP to spend it on eliminates this 
possibility. The creation of an Environmental Trust and use of third-party 
contractors also eliminates the risk that “[o]pportunistic violators may 
overestimate SEP costs in order to receive greater relief from the 
calculated penalty, or they may underreport the business benefits of 
SEPs.”186 It may be difficult for EPA officials in charge of overseeing the 
implementation of the SEP to correctly value the costs and benefits of an 
SEP.187 A defendant company could intentionally overestimate the 
implementation cost of an SEP in order to reduce the actual cost of the 
violation.188 Similarly, a defendant company could intentionally 
 
 
 183. Third Party and Aggregation Memo, supra note 123, at 4. 
 184. Id. 
 185. The current SEP policy states that the purpose of the SEP policy is to “obtain environmental 
or public health benefits that may not have occurred ‘but for’ the settlement.” 1998 SEP Policy, supra 
note 2, at 24,798 n.2. Therefore, the policy makes projects which the “defendant has previously 
committed to perform or have been started before the Agency has identified a violation” not eligible as 
SEPs. Id. Despite this provision in the SEP policy, defendants may still propose projects that they have 
previously intended to implement without the EPA’s knowledge. 
 186. Bonorris et al., supra note 95, at 206. 
 187. As mentioned briefly above, the EPA calculates the cost of an SEP using a computer model 
called PROJECT. The EPA admits that the computer model produces an estimate, not an exact cost. 
1998 SEP Policy, supra note 2, at 24,801 n.15.  
 188. “To use PROJECT, the Agency needs reliable estimates of the costs associated with a 
defendant/respondent’s performance of a SEP . . . .” Id. at 24,801. If the defendant gives unreliable 
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underestimate the economic benefits received189 from the implementation 
of an SEP in order to reduce the actual cost of the violation.190 If a third-
party contractor, who obtains the contract by placing the lowest bid, is in 
charge of providing the cost and savings estimates, the potential for 
overestimating costs and underestimating savings is eliminated.  
CONCLUSION 
The use of SEPs in settlements provides significant environmental 
benefits.191 The EPA recognizes these benefits and has announced a clear 
policy of encouraging the use of SEPs.192 Despite this clear support, SEPs 
are being underutilized.193 This underutilization can be attributed to the 
strict nexus requirement, the 80% ceiling on the mitigation percentage, 
 
 
estimates of the SEP costs, then the EPA will be unable to get a reasonable estimate of the SEP cost. 
Id. 
 189. In 2003, the EPA issued a memo explaining that EPA officials could approve profitable 
SEPs. This means that even though the violator may receive an economic benefit from the SEP, the 
EPA could approve it as an SEP. The EPA recommended no more than an 80% mitigation credit for 
profitable pollution prevention SEPs and no more than a 60% mitigation credit for all other profitable 
SEPs. In order to be accepted, a profitable SEP must meet a higher standard. This high standard can be 
met if the project demonstrates:  
(1) a high degree of innovation . . . with the potential for widespread application; (2) 
technology that is transferable to other facilities or industries, and the defendant/respondent 
will share information about the technology; (3) extraordinary environmental benefits that are 
quantifiable . . . ; (4) exceptional environmental or public health benefits to an Environmental 
Justice community; and/or (5) a high degree of economic risk for the alleged violator. 
Memorandum from John Peter Suarez, Assistant Adm’r, Envtl. Prot. Agency, to Reg’l Counsel et al. 6 
(Dec. 5, 2003), available at http://www.epa.gov/compliance/resources/policies/civil/seps/seps-
profitableprojects.pdf.  
 190. Defendant companies can experience savings with the implementation of an SEP. For 
example: “energy efficiency gains, reduced materials costs, reduced waste disposal costs, or increases 
in productivity.” 1998 SEP Policy, supra note 2, at 24,801.  
 191. SEPs provide many benefits for not only the environment but also the regulators, industry, 
and the community. “SEPs promote a cooperative relationship between the regulator and the violator, 
to the benefit of both.” Bonorris et al., supra note 95, at 203. SEPs also foster innovation in 
compliance and pollution prevention techniques. Defendants might attempt to use a new pollution 
prevention technology as an SEP. If the new technology is shown to be cost-effective, the EPA might 
encourage all members of the industry to adopt the technology. Id. at 203–05. “[R]egulators often lack 
resources to pursue cutting edge environmentally beneficial projects, . . . SEP programs provide a 
laboratory for innovation.” Id. at 204. SEPs also clearly benefit the ecosystems and communities in 
which they are undertaken. Id. at 204–05. “SEPs also provide certain corporations with opportunities 
to re-evaluate and improve upon inefficiencies in production processes.” Nghiem, supra note 23, at 
566. Companies that implement SEPs “often can improve competitive efficiency by lowering future 
compliance costs while simultaneously fulfilling their legal obligations.” Id. Lastly, some defendants 
“simply may derive greater satisfaction from having their money directed towards some tangible, 
environmentally beneficial purpose instead of having the same funds deposited into a general federal 
pool.” Id.  
 192. Expanding the Use of SEPs Memo, supra note 1, at 1. 
 193. Id.  
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and the fact that some cases are not conducive to the use of SEPs. This 
Notes argues that the EPA’s current SEP policy could be improved upon 
by taking three steps. First, the EPA should create and manage an 
Environmental Trust and use it to implement SEPs. Second, the mitigation 
percentage should be increased to 100% and the nexus requirement 
eliminated or relaxed. Third, the EPA should allow third-party contractors 
to bid on and carry out SEP contracts. This proposal would make SEPs a 
viable option for a greater number of violators and would lead to an 
increase in their use. It would also maximize the environmental benefit per 
SEP dollar by allowing the SEP money to be used in the most efficient 
manner possible. It is important to improve the current SEP policy and 
encourage the use of SEPs in settlements, because SEPs provide more 
environmental benefits than simply paying the penalties directly into the 
Treasury. Like penalties that are paid directly into the Treasury, SEPs 
serve a deterrent function. However, unlike penalties paid to the Treasury, 
SEPs also promote the EPA’s goals of protecting and enhancing public 
health and the environment.194 The full potential of SEPs has yet to be 
realized. If the SEP policy is not updated, this potential is likely to remain 
unrealized.  
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